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1. Introduction
1 Much has been said about Rorty’s ironist, a philosophical character mostly defined by
her reflective relationship with her “final vocabulary” – a set of words we employ to
justify and narrate ourselves. An ironist is someone who has “radical and continuing
doubts” about the final vocabulary she built while being brought up where and how she
was; she doesn’t think she can “underwrite or dissolve these doubts” by means of her
own final vocabulary; and while in a philosophical mood, she doesn’t believe her final
vocabulary  is  “closer  to  reality  than  others.”  The  figure  of  the  ironist  has  been
intensely  discussed,  specifically  with  regard  to  Rorty’s  proposal  for  a  political
rehabilitation of the “liberal ironist”: a political actor committed to the tenets of liberal
democracies who unflinchingly and courageously stands by those tenets while at the
same time considering them contingent and unable to be neutrally defended. What’s
more important in this liberalization of the ironist is, for Rorty, restraining her use of
her most used discursive weapon: redescription. By redescribing her own culture and
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commitments,  the  ironist  hopes  to  achieve  self-creation  and  individuality,  but  this
same attitude, when focused on someone else’s vocabularies,  beliefs and hopes,  can
embody  a  destructive  anti-social  side  –  namely,  what’s  perceived  as  a  particularly
vicious and distinct form of cruelty: humiliation.1
2 For all the discussion the figure of the liberal ironist has brought, one would think that
the  concept,  as  defined  in  terms  of  final  vocabularies,  would  be  clear  and  mostly
accepted. I  find that this is not the case. While the concept of a final vocabulary is
mostly undisputed, at least in letting it sink or swim together with the concept of a
liberal ironist,2 it cannot be said to be completely clear. To name several reasons: it is
briefly introduced by Rorty and rarely used beyond his controversial Contingency, Irony,
and Solidarity (CIS); it is no more defined beyond the use of a few examples of what could
constitute a final vocabulary; and from contextual implications of the use Rorty makes
of it in CIS, it’s not clear why it is framed as a set of words instead of beliefs given that it
stands for what characterizes a person’s identity. It’s also unclear exactly what relation
these words may have with beliefs. And yet, it  has been assumed to be an epistemic
notion  because  ironism itself  has  been  thought  to  be  an  epistemic  (relativist  or
skeptical)  stance (Lear 2011;  Schneewind 2010;  Williams 2003).  Others are staunchly
against this characterization and reduction of Rorty’s ironism to a type of skepticism
(Bernstein 2016; Ramberg 2014). While I tend to agree with the latter, ironism per se
will not be my focus here.
3 Both for detractors and faithful believers,  final vocabularies can seem to be merely
ladders to be thrown off once one has reached their destination: ironism. I would like
to argue otherwise, enlarging and working with the idea of final vocabularies to make
them clearer by reweaving them alongside more accepted and explained views about
personality and self-identity,  both in Rorty’s  later  philosophy and elsewhere.  If  I’m
successful, this will make the concept look like a useful and acute description of our
way of  speaking about  ourselves  and about  what’s  important  to  us.  Furthermore,  I
claim Rorty’s various reflections on the constitution of moral identity can be seen as
powerful alternatives to “deep theories” of human nature (Pinker 2004; Ramberg 2014;
Rorty 2004), yet, at the same time, being naturalistic through and through. Rorty, it
could be argued, used different ways of talking about selves in different places for a
reason: he left things vague because he didn’t see a need to clarify them. I believe there
is much to be gained by comparing them and reweaving them while at the same time
clarifying them. Rorty’s reasons do not have to be our reasons, and his tools can be
repurposed.  This  is  an exercise in redescription.  In attempting this,  I  lay hands on
concepts taken from sociolinguistics and the study of linguistic variants,  on Rorty’s
appropriation of Daniel Dennett’s metaphor that takes the I or the self as a “Center of
Narrative Gravity,” and – briefly – from the pragmatist theory of the formation of the
self presented by George H. Mead in Mind, Self and Society. I, therefore, leave aside the
problems associated with ironism and focus on the earlier step of working out what
final  vocabularies  are  supposed  to  be  in  general.  Alongside  the  main  discussion  I
attempt to explain why I think this concept matters today. 
4 In order to do so, in the next section (sec. 2) I briefly present the general notion of a
vocabulary  in  Rorty’s  philosophy,  or  what  Brandom  has  called  “the  ‘vocabulary’
vocabulary” (2000) and some general considerations regarding Rorty’s naturalism and
historicism to carry into the discussion of final vocabularies of the following sections.
In section 3, I reconstruct the way Rorty presents final vocabularies in CIS and compare
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it with his later approaches to personal identity and selfhood like the use of the idea of
the self as constituted by narratives. One of the central questions I try to answer here is
why does Rorty make final vocabularies play the central role for the constitution of
identities  that  he does? To put it  differently,  why don’t  beliefs play that  role? Why
words? To try to shed some light on this point I compare Rorty’s presentation of final
vocabularies in the context of CIS with the way in which sociolinguists treat different
linguistic variants or “lects.” Before ending this section, I detail my reconstruction of
the concept of “final  vocabulary” and the conclusions I  extracted from its  analysis.
Finally, in section 4, I discuss how these Rortian elements can be fruitfully brought into
current discussions regarding the nature of stereotypes. I take as an example Miranda
Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice and her statements to the idea of stereotypes –
prejudicial stereotypes – at the base of the phenomenon and attempt at sketching a
more controversial answer to a different question: the question of whether the “final
vocabulary” vocabulary shows any promise as a useful tool in moral discussions outside
the scope of liberal ironism. I think it does. 
 
2. The “Vocabulary” Vocabulary and its Merits 
5 Before discussing what final vocabularies are, I’d like to expand on what vocabularies
as such are supposed to be in Rorty’s work. Rorty has both naturalist and historicist
aspects interwoven in his writings. Robert Brandom epitomized this aspect of Rorty’s
work in his “Vocabularies of Pragmatism” (2000). On Brandom’s reading of Rorty, the
developing of the notion of “vocabulary” is taken to be a combined successor to the
explanatory  power  of  both  “language”  –  in  terms  of  structure  of  meanings,  and
“theory” – in terms of structure of beliefs. Both work in tandem as exemplars of the
analytic-synthetic  dichotomy,  and,  a  fortiori, of  the  scheme-content  dichotomy.  One
could argue that Rorty here is trying to be a good Davidsonian and Sellarsian and learn
from the mistakes of logical empiricism. The successor concept of “vocabulary” allows
us  to  describe  both  the  vocabulary  of  the  historicist  and  the  vocabulary  of  the
naturalist  as  not  only  non-overlapping  magisteria,  but  also  as  complementary  and
reinforcing  of  each  other.  According  to  Brandom,  Rorty’s  attack  on  semantic
representationalism that marks his work, at least from Mirror onward, rests on the idea
that representations intend to play both causal and justificatory roles. Representations
are supposed to be caused by the world and justified by it.  The Kantian moral that
Rorty  would  be  reminding  us  of  is  that  justification  is  a  normative  concept  and
causation is not.  The world, in the sense of extravocabulary pressures (cf.  Tartaglia
2007: 214-6), can only cause beliefs, not justify them. Only beliefs can justify beliefs,
because only intravocabulary relations can be considered normative. 
6 To rephrase the preceding, vocabularies, in a first sense, are something attributed to
others and oneself in order to explain behavior (cf. Rorty 2000b). Instead of saying that
someone acts like she acts because she has this or that language, understands things in
a particular way, and has this or that theory about how things work. we just attribute a
vocabulary  to  that  person.  A  vocabulary  stands  for  a  loose  description  of  a  social
practice, with all its conceptual norms. In that social practice, words mean what they
mean because people use them in certain institutionalized ways and not  in others.
Their mutual correction of one another engenders the norms that bind each member to
a correct or incorrect usage of the words – what gives them their meaning (cf. Myers &
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Verheggen 2016). Brandom calls this a “pragmatism about norms” (2000: 16), a position
made available by the rejection of the Myth of the Given identified by Wilfrid Sellars in
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. A label for a position Rorty, as a good Sellarsian,
exemplified throughout his career. The ways in which we use words are a function of
what we believe – of what we are willing to commit ourselves to in a social setting and
what we are willing to do. Since, from a Davidsonian standpoint, assertions are actions,
and actions are bodily movements explainable as being caused by beliefs and desires,
what something means and the beliefs one has are inseparable. One can only use words
in sentences with certain illocutionary force. Only in saying something can an element
of  what  one said,  a  word,  have meaning.  We attribute  meanings and intentions by
rationalizing  the  communicative  actions  of  others  and  ourselves.  In  this  way,
vocabularies attributed to a person explain her actions in the sense of giving causes for
those actions and also contain the justifications of the assertions that person makes.
Rorty goes further and says that a person does not just have a vocabulary but is a
vocabulary. And since a vocabulary is a social practice, a shared practice, in order to be
a person, someone has to be a certain kind of person before being able to count as an
individual. Being socialized, acquiring a vocabulary is just becoming a person. That is,
something capable of being committed and being entitled – a someone, in short. Being
someone just is being a participant in the game of giving and asking for reasons, a
bearer of  (inferential)  rights and obligations.  It  is  interesting to note that in “Non-
Reductive Physicalism” (1990), a text first presented before (1987) the publication of
CIS, Rorty presents “selves” as consisting of desires and beliefs, not final vocabularies.
The fact that these two texts were presented around the same period further presses
the question of just what the relationship between describing selves as sets of beliefs
and desires and describing them as incarnated (final) vocabularies is. 
7 Pushing  forward  Brandom’s  redescription  of  his  work  that  Rorty  himself  endorses
(2000c;  2010a)  and  what  we  can  attribute  from  his  endorsement  of  Davidsonian
“metaphysics” (Rorty 1990): from a causal vocabulary, we are explainable, predictable –
to the degree attainable by our best natural explanations of the day. Our beliefs are
physical  states  caused  by  the  world  (both  the  world  inside  our  skins  and  the  one
outside) under a different description. The description of a historicist vocabulary in
which only through being socialized as a member of a society, as an embodied instance
of  a  shared vocabulary,  can one count  as  believing,  and not  just  being disposed in
different ways, in the first place. Now, is there some further relationship between these
two vocabularies? Brandom suggests that causal vocabularies (the vocabularies of the
natural  sciences)  insofar  as  they  are  vocabularies,  imply  norms.  Vocabularies,  as
“implicitly  normative  discursive  practices”  (Brandom  2000:  167),  even  the  causal
vocabularies, can be discussed as vocabularies:
We can ask such questions as how the vocabulary of Newtonian causes arose, and
how it differs from the vocabulary of Aristotelian causes in the questions it prompts
us  to  ask  about  ourselves  and  our  activities.  Rorty  himself  often  pursues  such
questions,  and  thereby  affirms  his  practical  commitment  to  historicism.  But
developing and applying vocabularies is something that we, natural creatures, do.
Our  doing  of  it  consists  in  the  production  of  causally  conditioned,  causally
efficacious performances. That is to say that using vocabularies is one among many
other things that is describable in the vocabulary of causes. (Brandom 2000: 167)
8 Just as the vocabulary of causes is a vocabulary, the capabilities expressed in deploying
or enacting a vocabulary can be described as something that a creature causally linked
to its environment can do. Although Brandom does not carry the issue further in this
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piece, we can find in his earlier and later work a thorough development of this kind of
relationship between genealogies of vocabularies and their causal efficacy. Rorty, in
Brandom’s  terminology,  employs  a  pragmatism  about  norms  which,  in  turn,  is a
“fundamental pragmatism.” A fundamental pragmatism is a metaphilosophical thesis
that attributes to practical know how logical and explanatory priority over propositional
know  that  (Brandom 2011).  Applied  to  his  pragmatism about  norms,  this  pragmatic
position  opposes  what  he  calls  “regulism”  (Brandom  1998:  20).  Regulism  is  an
intellectualist conception of norms in which every application of a norm presupposes
an antecedently present rule that “determines what is correct by explicitly saying so”
(1998: 20). Brandom takes Wittgenstein to have proven how rules, explicitly stateable
principles, presuppose implicit and practical norms by showing how an intellectualist
conception  implies  an  infinite  regress.  Since  not  only  actions  can  be  correct  or
incorrect but also the application of the rule governing those actions can be applied
correctly  or  incorrectly,  supposing  that  every  assessment  of  correctness  or
incorrectness  implies  rules  to  account  for  the  correctness  itself  implies  a  vicious
infinite  regress  of  rules.  This  point  –  crucial  to  Brandom’s  conception  of  material
inferences  –  is  attributed  to  Rorty  in  his  conception  of  the  meta-vocabulary  of
vocabularies. Knowing how to follow a rule is prior to knowing that one is following a
rule. Making a rule explicit is a game that can only be played if one is already a rule
follower – in terms of having the social status and the accompanying capacities of an
applier of  norms –  in  a  shared social  practice.3 According to  Brandom’s  use  of  the
Hegelian distinction between norms and rules, norms are implicit and practical, and
rules are explicit and propositional. They express what is implicit in a practice. That’s
where they derive their normative force from.4 A fundamental pragmatism, like any
pragmatism  about  norms,  is,  according  to  Brandom,  also  a  subject  naturalism.  Or  a
naturalism that focuses on what we do instead of on what our words refer to. Subject
naturalism is opposed to object naturalism – or traditional reductive naturalism. This
distinction,  made  by  Huw  Price  (2011),  distinguishes  two  different  ways  of
understanding the relationship between philosophy and the natural  sciences.  Rorty
(2007a) takes Price’s version of naturalism as his own, and also welcomes Brandom’s
reading of the import of the “vocabulary” vocabulary5 (Rorty 2000c). So, to summarize
this section. Rorty hammered out and used a sophisticated tool for the naturalization
and historization of philosophy (cf. Ramberg 2004), Brandom’s redescription of it only
allows  us  to  flesh  it  out  and  make  explicit  what  is  somehow  implicit  in  Rorty’s
Wittgensteinian, Sellarsian, and Davidsonian commitments. I wish to carry forward the
elements above to the discussion of the less explored notion of “final vocabularies” in
the following section. 
 
3. Speech Communities, Moral Communities
9 Rorty  presents  final  vocabularies  as  follows:  “a  set  of  words  which  they  [humans]
employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives” (Rorty 1989: 73). We use
these words to praise our friends and show contempt for our foes,  to describe our
projects,  doubts  and hopes.  They  are  also  “the  words  in  which  we  tell,  sometimes
prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives.” On one side, it is a
vocabulary in that it contains words, both thin and flexible, like “right,” “true,” “good,”
“beautiful,”; and thick and more rigid words like “England,” “Christ,” “decency,” “the
Revolution,” “progressive,” etcetera; on the other, it is final in that we cannot justify
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these words other than by shorter or longer circles. Besides this circular recourse we
can only passively give in without hope of redeeming them or defend them by force, to
stand our ground.  While justifying,  we can’t  go beyond these words with language.
Doubt about one’s final vocabulary is doubt about one’s self.6 Final vocabularies are
markers for identity, we’ll elaborate on this. 
10 The relation between “final words” – words belonging to a final vocabulary – and the
“platitudes” by which we justify them is a relation of expression. The platitudes, or
beliefs “nobody wants to argue about” (Rorty 1989: 47), come forth when a challenge
arises to one’s identity. Rorty explains this point while describing common sense:7 
When common sense is challenged, its adherents respond at first by generalizing
and making explicit the rules of the language game they are accustomed to play
[…]. (Rorty 1989: 74)
11 This generalization process is the expression of the implicit relations between words of
a final vocabulary, which, in this passage is tellingly named as a “language game.” This
implicitness  is  contained in  the  know-how needed to  play  the  –  commonsensical  or
otherwise  –  language  game  in  which  our  –  commonsensical  or  otherwise  –  final
vocabulary is inserted. These words have meaning in their relation to other words, in a
holistic manner8, just like every other word from a Davidsonian standpoint. That’s why
final  vocabularies are sets,  they display their finality as groups of words.  No single
word  on  its  own  could  play  that  role,  because  no  single  word  plays  any role  in  a
vacuum. So, when I take the liberty of saying “final word” I only mean a word that
belongs to a final vocabulary, that word couldn’t count as final on its own. Rorty goes
on to say that, for a metaphysician, philosophical inquiry will tend to be an analysis of
these platitudes9 or generalizations from our practice that contextually define some
final words, “thin” words in particular, because they are used in almost every context. 
12 The “platitudes” Rorty is talking about are those beliefs we take for granted and that
we don’t see a point in defending; what we defend with them is our final vocabularies,
which,  in  turn,  standing as  their  inferential  articulation,  constitute  beliefs  that  are
central to our self-image: 
All beliefs which are central to a person’s self-image are so because their presence
or absence serves as a criterion for dividing good people from bad people, the sort
of person one wants to be from the sort one does not want to be. (Rorty 1989: 47)
13 Those beliefs that are central are those that contain mostly thick (final) words, words
like  “progressive”  or  “conservative.”  Beliefs  that  instantiate  these  terms  would  be
something like “being progressive is good,” “being conservative is bad,” such beliefs can be
said to sententially (propositionally) express implicit  relations between words in our
vocabularies. In these cases, the way a thick word is linked with a thin word. In Rorty’s
view, these kinds of “platitudes” (beliefs) express “thickening” or “thinning” relations
between words, since they contextually define, in our example, “good people” in terms
of “something like a liberal,” or condone liberals subsuming them under the – already
defined in terms of exemplars – thin term “good.” Central beliefs, then, are those that
express  the more basic  moral  commitments  of  a  given final  vocabulary,  those that
revolve around exemplars of good people and bad people – thick words mostly, and
conversely, final vocabularies, are populated by words that are used when expressing
beliefs  implicit  in  our  linguistic  moral  practices  –  or  moral  practices,  period.  This
suggests the way in which talking about selves as constituted by beliefs and desires and
talking about selves as being incarnated final vocabularies are not incompatible, but
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two  ways  of  talking  about  the  same  thing.  The  question  is:  Why?  What  do  final
vocabularies bring to the table that beliefs and desires don’t?
14 More  has  to be  said  about  final  vocabularies  before  we  can  address  this  question
directly.  It  is  important  to  note  that  while  final  vocabularies  can  be  changed  and
consciously manipulated to some extent, having one is not optional, being someone and
having a final vocabulary is part of the same process. Before one can have doubts about
one’s final vocabulary, like the ironist and the metaphysician do – in opposition to the
commonsensical  human, they must first  have one.  We are all  endowed with a final
vocabulary  in  virtue  of  our  language  and  acculturation.  Our  “standard”  final
vocabulary is a final vocabulary we mostly share with others – with our “tribe,” being
who we are is, at least initially, more like being a certain kind of person than being a
one of a kind autonomous individual. Rorty exemplifies this point regarding the doubts
of the ironist: 
The  ironist  spends  her  time  worrying  about  the  possibility  that  she  has  been
initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries
that the process of socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her
a language may have given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the
wrong kind of human being. (Rorty 1989: 75)
Nothing can serve as a criticism of a person save another person, or of a culture
save  an  alternative  culture  –  for  persons  and  cultures  are,  for  us  [ironists]
incarnated vocabularies. (Rorty 1989: 80)
15 Having a final vocabulary is being the member of a tribe, being a tribe or culture is the
use of the same final vocabulary by its members.10 Take note that I’m saying, “final
vocabulary”  and  not  just  “vocabulary”  while  stipulating  what  kind  of  incarnated
vocabulary  a  person  or  a  culture  is.  I’d  like  to  link  final  vocabularies  with  moral
communities – in contrast with looser human groups, and selves – in contrast with
mere biological individuals of the human species.
16 Rorty uses the term “final vocabulary” both in singular form and in the plural “final
vocabularies.” When using it  in the plural,  he does not always mean different final
vocabularies of different persons, but sometimes different final vocabularies of a single
person.  Specifically,  for  instance,  when  we  get  this  description  of  a  liberal
metaphysician as someone who wishes a single final vocabulary throughout her self-
descriptions,  in  opposition  to  the  liberal  ironist,  who  privatizes  her  constantly
redescribed private self-descriptions but maintains a liberal public self-description11:
The  liberal  metaphysician,  by  contrast  [to  the  liberal  ironist],  wants  a  final
vocabulary […] [that] is not split down the middle by a public-private distinction
[…]. (Rorty 1989: 92)
17 A split of the self, so to speak. We’ll deal with this shortly, and I believe it is important,
but before, a quick recapitulation: Up to this point we had selves as constituted by
beliefs (Rorty 1990), and selves as incarnated vocabularies in CIS. This is brought up in
the  discussion of  the  liberal  ironist:  someone that-unlike  the  metaphysician or  the
commonsensical human – could be constituted as more than one final vocabulary. This
is  where  talk  of  selves  as  sets  of  beliefs  and  desires  can  become  particularly
troublesome. It  would be hard to make the liberal ironist look anything other than
pathological. In what other light could we see someone that has more than one set of
beliefs and desires? Of course, we could always talk about someone that doesn’t fall
victim to her impulses and restrains herself, but this is not exactly how Rorty wanted to
paint the liberal ironist. Restraining herself, in a way, is a part of what a liberal ironist
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is, but Rorty proposes a subtle liberation of the liberal ironist, he’s not showing her the
mast to which to tie herself. It’s not mere public duty that binds her, but sincere social
solidarity. Regardless of whether this last point comes across as clear or not for the
time being, the splitting of the self is not a central point in CIS, Rorty expands the idea
further in his career. He later makes use of Daniel Dennett’s metaphor for selfhood that
takes the self to be a “center of narrative gravity” (Dennett 1992). Meaning a fictional
character that is narrated about by that self’s brain. In simple terms: what we say of
ourselves constitutes us, and what we say depends on what we do and how we justify it
– and to whom. Rorty uses this way of speaking of narratives constituting the self to
explain moral dilemmas, treating them not as conflicts between whimsical sentiment
and hard reason, but as conflicts between “selves in dispute”: 
This non-Kantian view of morality can be rephrased as the claim that one’s moral
identity is determined by the group or groups with which one identifies – the group
or groups to which one cannot be disloyal and still like oneself. Moral dilemmas are
not  […]  the  result  of  a  conflict  between  reason  and  sentiment  but  between
alternative selves, […]. Non-Kantians do not think that we have a central, true self
by virtue of our membership in the human species […]. They can, instead, agree
with Daniel Dennett that a self is a center of narrative gravity. In non-traditional
societies,  most  people  have  several  such  narratives  at  their  disposal,  and  thus
several different moral identities. (Rorty 2007b: 45)
18 The  structure  of  the  self  Rorty  describes  through Dennett  echoes  the  work  of  the
pragmatist and social psychologist George H. Mead in which one has to be a member of
a community in order to become a self (Mead 1966: 162):
The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of
his  social  group;  and the  structure  of  his  self  expresses  or  reflects  the  general
behavior pattern of this social group to which he belongs, just as does the structure
of the self of every other individual belonging to this social group. […] The process
out  of  which  the  self  arises  is  a  social  process  which  implies  interaction  of
individuals in the group, implies the pre-existence of the group. (Mead 1966: 164)
19 For Mead, the self has, as a condition of its possibility, that the person become an object
to itself. In a sort of linguistically inspired tone, Mead characterizes the parts of the self
(a  word  that  works  as  the  root  of  all  reflexive  pronouns)  as  the  “Me”  (objective
pronoun) and the “I” (subjective pronoun). A “Me” is an objectified self, someone in its
functional role of being another to itself; the “I” is the subject proper, the role of the
self that instantiates all spontaneity; it is the part of the self that enters in a relation to
itself  through  the  “Me.”  Only language,  the  use  of  “signifying  vocal  gestures”  or
symbols,  can  make  this  reflexive  stance  happen.  Only  through  linguistic
communication with others can selves happen at all. I only bring Mead to the table to
signal that if he appears to get some inspiration from the analysis of the words we use
to  speak  about  ourselves  (“I,”  “Me,”  “Self”),  Rorty  goes  all  the  way  in  the
linguistification of this type of theory of identity that isn’t afraid to put society first
and  personhood  last12 –  and  “full”  personhood  as  only  the  achievement  of  a  few
particularly fortunate, skilled, and tenacious individuals.13
20 All the above notwithstanding, Rorty seems to abandon his talk about selfhood in terms
of final vocabularies about the time he begins to talk of narratives around a self
instead. This self may bear one or more different narratives within, and that, in turn, is
a function of the several groups of people one is loyal to. This is clearly a change in
perspective, but I don’t believe it’s a change of heart on the matter. If we look closely,
the topic of group membership as shaping our moral identity already appears, quite
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centrally, even in CIS.14 Specifically, when Rorty talks about Sellarsian “we-intentions,”
the notion that the primitive explanatory concept for moral obligation is “to be one of
us.” For each group we belong to we can say: “we all want…” – as opposite to “I want…,”
we can formulate “we-intentions.” This is a moral identity in CIS. Rorty adds to this
Sellarsian view the claim that “the force of ‘us’ is, typically, contrastive in the sense
that it contrasts with a ‘they’ which is also made up of human beings – the wrong sort
of human beings” (Rorty 1989: 190). In sum, we-intentions typically imply and draw
their force from the persons we don’t want to be. Moral community between different
selves,  the  joining  together  of  a  former  “they”  into  a  “we”  depends,  in  CIS,  on
“similarities  and dissimilarities”  that  “strike  us  as  salient.”  And that  salience  is  “a
function of  a  historically  contingent final  vocabulary” (1989:  192).  In Rorty’s  newer
vocabulary we could say that it’s a function of a narrative derived from a historically
contingent  group  membership  (cf.  Penelas  2012;  Voparil  2014).  Talk  of  final
vocabularies or narratives, I believe, is a contextual matter. Final vocabularies are only
used to characterize ironism because they are a subtler tool than simpler identities
require. Typical moral identities can be described more easily by talk of narratives of a
self. But ironism is everything but typical. It is a meta-stable position in which self-
description is constantly changed. Final vocabularies, by being looser than narratives
(and beliefs) in the sense of not having their more fixed structure, can characterize in a
more satisfactory way the constant moral restructuring the ironist inflicts on herself. A
single final vocabulary can develop into several different narratives. Just by using the
same important words and arranging them differently. So, final vocabularies are more
stable than narratives – while still being a product of group membership. Someone who
has a final vocabulary, such as someone with a certain narrative, still belongs to some
group, but in a looser sense. 
21 If what I’m saying is correct, having a single final vocabulary, which involves beliefs
central to a person, can accommodate different narratives while still being a common-
sense final vocabulary. That person, while experiencing changes, is not experiencing
the profound disruption on her self-image that Rorty’s ironist experiences. While the
common-sense man that changes what he tells of himself with his final vocabulary may
be in the process of re-shaping his loyalties, he will still be affected by the grasp of those
words that connect him with the kind of people that share them. He might not use
them in the same way as his peers, but he will know the way in which they use them,
their use will be still a part of his divergent use. On the other hand, the ironist wishes
to change not only the truth-values or the arranging of some of the words in her final
vocabulary, but the truth candidates – the words and all  of the semantic-pragmatic
relations between them – themselves to make them her own, she does not care about
their truth but about their origin. Most of us are narrators and apologists of ourselves,
and as such, deal in prose; the ironist, on the other hand, deals in poetry and thrives for
novel  metaphors to  weave into her  final  vocabulary.  That’s  why narratives  are too
broad and rough to speak about ironism, narratives cannot capture the radical changes
that Rorty wishes to ascribe to his ironist. Just as beliefs couldn’t fully account for the
way in which a liberal ironist could be said to have a liberal public final vocabulary and
an ironist private final vocabulary without suggesting inconsistency or pathology. 
22 After claiming, like I did, that final vocabularies and narratives are two interrelatable
ways  of  describing  the  same  phenomenon  –  both  involving  beliefs  in  one  way  or
another, I’ll  take the liberty of unifying both Rortian vocabularies and speak of each
moral group membership – each group membership that enables “we-intentions” or a
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talk of a “us” – as providing us not only with a narrative – or part of a narrative, but
with a (lower case) final vocabulary – let’s remember that final vocabularies are loosely
identified as the words we use to justify (narrate, …) ourselves. Different activities or
relationships with people can demand different justificatory (narrative, …) arsenal. In
each domain in which we narrate or justify ourselves we will have a narrative and a
final vocabulary that accompanies it. In different domains or groups we belong to we
will typically have different narratives, but the different final vocabularies can overlap
a great deal. Letting us talk, in sufficiently coherent selves, of a whole (upper case)
Final Vocabulary. Our everyday moral practice evidences the degree of inconsistencies
that can arise between what we say of ourselves in different domains or in different
time-slices.  This  way  of  talking  can  accommodate  the  simple,  and  subtle,  changes
(consistent or not) of narrative and the profound and drastic changes of great portions
of our Final Vocabulary. Changes in narrative do not imply a significant change in our
Final Vocabulary, even if they rearrange it slightly, but substitution of great deals of
our  Final  Vocabulary  are  bound  to  have  drastic  impacts  on  our  narratives  and
justificatory practices. Such a change would imply a drastic reworking of who we take
ourselves to be, what to hope, to fear and with which persons we consider ourselves
related to and how.
23 Before going back to final vocabularies and cashing out some of the promissory notes
handed out in the preceding sections, I would like to offer an analogy that can help us
see the “final vocabulary” vocabulary as not just a dispensable tool for characterizing
liberal ironists as not just crazy intellectuals, but as a nuanced way of speaking about
ourselves. This analogy involves a brief excursus through Sociolinguistics. 
 
3.1 Words and Group Membership – The Case from Sociolinguistics
24 Sociolinguistics  is  the  study  of  the  different  ways  that  any  given  language  varies
depending  on  its  contexts  of  use  (cf.  Llamas,  Mullany  &  Stockwell  2006;  O’Grady,
Dobrovolsky & Katamba 1997). A language has different variants – e.g. dialects that are
spoken in different geographical locations. Variants are considered such with respect
to a given standard language, which is historically-politically sanctioned as such; it’s
less changing than its peers with lesser degrees of normalization and social prestige. To
every  language  corresponds  a  linguistic  community  that  speaks  it;  to  each  variant
(including  the  standard  variety)  corresponds  a  speech  community.  Speech
communities,  besides  the  already  mentioned  dialects  –  that  are  individuated  by
geographical  location  –  can  be  distinguished  by  a  myriad  of  factors,  from  socio-
economic  status,  profession,  gender,  ethnicity  and  age,  to  any  given  interaction
imaginable  of  these  and  other  aspects.  As  mentioned,  dialects  represent  the
geographical variants of a language; other types of lexical, syntactical, morphological
and  phonological  variants  fall  between  the  spectrum  of  sociolects  and  idiolects.
Registers,  another  element  involved  in  communication  studied  by  sociolinguistics,
refer  to  the  contextually  and  intentionally  defined  tones  and  contents  of
communication. I will only refer to sociolects, idiolects and registers in their lexical
sense.  I  will  not  address  phonological,  morphological  or,  let  alone,  syntactical
variations. 
25 A  speaker  can  participate  in  several  speech  communities,  and  for  each  speech
community that speaker will take part in a different sociolect that, in turn, will shape
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her stock of words, ways of pronouncing and writing them, and in some cases ways in
which  to  arrange  those  words  into  sentences.  No  matter  how  many  speech
communities two speakers have in common, there will be some differences in their way
of speaking. Such extreme variants, corresponding to “speech communities of one,” are
called idiolects. Idiolects are the thing which the individual speaker happens to forge
out of her interaction with other speakers and in her involvement in different speech
communities. In sum, sociolects regarded as lexical variants are words a person uses
predominantly in relation to some groups, and (lexical) idiolects are words a person
has  in  virtue  of  the  convergence  of  all  of  her  group  memberships,  including  the
membership in her community with herself, but that no other speaker has. 
26 Before parting with sociolinguistics,  we need to say a few words about registers.  A
“register” is a certain tone and content one employs in each communicative situation
to adapt to such situation’s demands and to accomplish whatever one wishes to obtain
from  it.  Registers  bring  forth  the  different  aspects  of  our  idiolect  in  particular
situations, such as our “technolect” (technical sociolect, or “lect” deriving from our
technical competence in a field) in a job interview, or our dialect when visiting our
home  town,  or  even  the  part  or  layer  of  our  idiolect  we  may  adopt  to  chastise,
congratulate or talk to ourselves (cf. Coupland 2007). To say it in Mead’s words: 
Of course, a good deal of the self does not need to get expression. We carry on a
whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one
man and another thing to another. There are parts of the self which exist only for
the self in relationship with itself. (Mead 1966: 142)
27 I want to relate Rorty’s way of speaking about final vocabularies with regard to our
group  memberships  and  (upper  case)  Final  Vocabulary regarding  all  our  group
memberships – including our membership in our community with ourselves – with
sociolects and idiolects. I want to make two claims regarding this to underpin what I
take to be Rorty’s views: the first is rather uncontroversial: our final vocabularies are a
particular subset of words of our sociolects and idiolect, the words we use to justify and
narrate ourselves; the second one should look familiar by now: just as sociolects and
idiolects are characterized in their relation to speech communities, final vocabularies
are characterized in relation to moral communities. Sociolinguists study how our social
relationships shape our way of speaking and vice versa, Rorty is interested in how what
we do  shapes  what  we  tell  of  ourselves,  our  prospects  and others’  and  vice  versa.
Sociolinguistics characterizes how our linguistic variants shape us as speakers;  Rorty
wants  to  characterize  how our  choice  –  limited  as  it  might  be  due  to  our  societal
constraints – of words in our narratives shapes us as persons. As we have already seen,
such narratives  are our  selfhood,  and,  for  Rorty,  every narrative  about  or  around 15
ourselves is a moral one. It is in this sense that, just as Rorty can be considered as
linguistifyng a pragmatist theory of identity in which the social is primitive like Mead’s
social  psychology,  he  can  also  be  considered  as  moralizing  sociolinguistic
considerations about the relationship between speech and identity. It is this last point I
want to stress in the closing section. 
 
3.2 Final Vocabularies Revisited
28 To  finish  my  redescription  of  final  vocabularies,  I  would  like  to  discuss  what  the
previous  means  for  the  clarification  of  the  importance  and  meaning  of  final
vocabularies that we began with. For instance, why sets of words and not beliefs? The
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choice, as I anticipated, is between webs of beliefs and desires, narratives that commit
us to certain beliefs, and words that constitute such narratives. As a good holist, beliefs
on their own couldn’t do the job of describing someone’s identity, let alone someone as
complex as the liberal ironist. Words, as we have seen in the case of sociolinguistics, are
a more basic mark for group membership and identity than beliefs,  they link us to
greater  numbers  of  people  than  beliefs  do.  But  Rorty’s  choosing  of  words  as  the
element out of which final vocabularies emerge gives us more than that, they are not
only  words  used  simply  more than  others,  they  are  the  words  our  narratives  are
constructed  around,  they  embody  group  membership  in  a  morally  engaged  sense.
These are words we don’t only use by way of our being brought up with them, but with
our deliberate (yet not unconstrained), and progressive choosing of them. We not only
get them like the lexical part of our sociolects, we also choose them instead of others
every time we speak about ourselves. Their nodal function in narratives also permits
the  interplay  of  relative  inconsistencies  between  different  narratives  or  different
elements in our narratives. Beliefs are too rigid and often would have to be abandoned
whilst shedding narratives; words can be carried over with different workings between
them, with slightly or otherwise different meanings by their context and use. It is a
looser knot than the one we get with beliefs, but words tie our different narratives all
the same,  and even more of  them while at  it.  Words can mark our membership in
groups in  similar  ways  as  beliefs  can and can also  put  a  stronger  emphasis  in  our
relationship with people through them regardless of communion of (central) beliefs. 
29 The distinction between thick and thin words also plays a role in this, since the thicker
the words, the stronger the link with the groups that they bind us with. Thin words, by
contrast, are the loose knots that could be said to bind our different final vocabularies
into a single, give or take, coherent Final Vocabulary or “moral [lexical] idiolect,” they
make up our different moral sociolects into a single moral idiolect, capable of engaging
more people than before. Thick words pull the strongest, but, Rorty claims, if we are
lucky  enough  to  live  with  enough  security  and  sympathy  in  our  midst,  our  thick
commitments could be tamed by our contingently construed thin unifying vocabulary
that would enable us to come into contact and moral communion with increasingly
diverse and  larger  groups  of  people.  The  words  we  use  and  shape  us  commit  us
primarily with groups of people and indirectly with sets of beliefs. These groups are
moral standards we live by and there is no way of saying which will win out in each
conflict. Either our thin beliefs instantiated in some of our thin narratives, or our most
basic beliefs that tell us which groups we are part of, who we “really” are, what (and
who) we really care for. If one would like to express the link between final vocabularies
and beliefs, one would have to say that they commit us to partnership in groups, some
words cannot play the justifying role that final vocabularies play without one’s belief
that in some sense one is part of the people who say such things or act in a given way. 
30 Final vocabularies, I would emphasize, have to be taken as sets of words and only as
sets of words just because focusing on what beliefs can be abstracted from them is just
missing the point of taking the trouble to talk about final vocabularies in the first place.
Rorty makes this last point clear. Those words stand or fall, mostly, together. Group
membership does not just endow us with a stock of words but with certain meaningful
relationships between them. If I were to justify myself as a philosopher (or a spouse, or
brother, or Argentinian) I would end up using a limited but interrelated set of words to
say  things  for  myself.  Beyond  them  I  could  say  nothing  new,  and  while  those
Redescribing Final Vocabularies
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
12
relationships can vary a lot, they cannot be taken independently of each other. If I were
to change my narrative, I would probably have to adjust the way I use certain words,
when I use them, and for what purpose.
31 This is where the analogy with sociolinguistics comes in handy. While addressing moral
issues it is very tempting to dispense with complexities and proclaim simple rules of
behavior. This is analogous with the study of languages as abstract entities from which
grammarians and grammar enthusiasts usually go prescriptive on the actual speech of
actual speakers. It is no surprise that it is sometimes claimed that only competence,
and not linguistic performance is the proper aim of the scientific study of languages.
Performance is too particular to be studied scientifically – we can hear Aristotle saying
in  the  background.  Sociolinguistics’  productive  development  can  be  taken  as  an
argument for a more nuanced understanding of speech. A lot happens closer to the
ground that can be studied and reflected upon. Max Weinreich, a famous sociolinguist,
is credited as saying that “languages are dialects with an army and a navy” as a way of
reminding  us  of  the  historically  contingent  status  of  our  standard  languages.
Sociolinguists  don’t  see  the  contingency  of  their  subject  as  an  impediment  for
understanding. In morality we shouldn’t either. It is just this focus on particularity and
the moral relevance of individuality and contingency in all its richness that talk of final
vocabularies can be seen as sharing with sociolinguistics. If a toolset like the one Rorty
offers us to focus on those words that we use in justificatory and narrative contexts can
be put to use in order to analyze morally loaded talk, then richer interactions between
macro moral theories and micro moral theories could be imagined.
32 It would be extremely difficult (although, I believe, not impossible) to obtain even an
approximate list of words that would constitute an actual final vocabulary, but they are
none the worse for that. Final vocabularies are just a theoretical relational aspect of a
complex narrative about moral identity,  found in different corners of Rorty’s work,
that was hammered out to throw some light into a difficult moral phenomenon while
expressing his implicit commitments with his pragmatist and naturalist backgrounds.
Not only can Rorty provide a subtler vocabulary for talking about the complex moral
phenomenon he is preoccupied with but can do so without betraying his commitment
to the idea that we are just clever animals. 
33 I find this interesting because Rorty came to find the vocabulary of CIS as cumbersome
and counterproductive  for  liberal  goals.  Furthermore,  he  openly  denounced it.  One
need only look at his (second) debate with Nancy Fraser (2000; Rorty 2000a), here we
find that Rorty talks like a universalist,  he doesn’t  argue with Fraser from his own
philosophical positions but rejoins in the vocabulary of the public intellectual apologist
of the Old Left in Achieving Our Country.  There is something to be learned from this.
Rorty said clearly that he worried about the almost certain possibility that Democracy
would fail (Rorty 1999b: 89-90). Democracy requires an engaged public, living wages
and a sense of belonging (Rorty 1989: Chapter 9; 2000c; 1998b). One could argue that it
is for this reason that he grew increasingly anxious about the ineffectiveness of the
intellectuals and what they talked about, attempting practicing what he preached and
abandoning sophisticated involvements in political matters. 
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4. On the Prospects of the “Final Vocabulary” 
Vocabulary of Being a Useful Tool Beyond the Scope
of Ironism
34 As a way of concluding this re-evaluation of final vocabularies, I would like to take this
chance to speculate on how a redescription of the tools developed by Rorty in CIS, like
the  one  I  attempted  above,  could  be  used  to  understand  other  areas  of  current
research.  Miranda  Fricker’s  Epistemic  Injustice has  brought  to  the  center  of
epistemological  discussions  one  aspect  of  the  complex  interrelations  between
epistemology and ethics.  One element of her proposal involves the inescapability of
stereotypes  in  our  testimonial  exchanges  and  assessments  of  credibility.  Taking  a
middle  road  between  reductionist16 and  non-reductionist  approaches  to  the
epistemology  of  testimony,  Fricker  proposes  a  view  in  which  both  the  rational
acceptability  of  testimony and the  phenomenology  of  our  testimonial  exchanges  is
respected. The way in which she does this involves a passive critical capacity for the
evaluation  of  testifiers’  credibility  that  only  becomes  active  and  conscious  when
something  goes  awry.  This  helps  Fricker  concede  an  important  point  to  the  non-
reductionists:  their  phenomenological  point  that  we  don’t  seem  to  notice  in  most
testimonial exchanges making any effort to take testimony as credible or faulty – we
don’t seem to carry on any inference or complex process in its evaluation, while at the
same time explaining the critical and rational nature of testimony. We critically, yet
passively, assess a testifier’s credibility in virtue of perceptual judgements informed by
stereotypes of people like her. Our previous testimonial exchanges inform our present
ones through the mediation of the classification of persons in stereotypes. In this way,
Fricker  makes  abundantly  clear  why  prejudices  are  so  prevalent  and  difficult  to
eradicate: they are stereotypes that become immune to countervailing evidence due to
emotionally  faulty  elements.  This  explains  why  her  account  is  a  non-ideal  theory:
epistemic injustice is the default state of testimonial exchanges since most of the time
our  stereotypes,  while  irreplaceable,  will  not  be  up  to  the  task.  Especially  when  a
testimonial exchange involves disparities in power between listener and hearer. This is
where testimonial injustices happen the most.  We don’t believe (at all,  or as much)
someone we should (rationally, morally) believe due to culpable prejudices we possess.
Fricker goes on to explain the many ways in which epistemic injustices harm speakers
(and, secondarily, hearers), both epistemically and ethically. 
35 I believe much can be said about how Rorty can be a powerful ally in the understanding
of the harms of epistemic injustice (cf. Penelas 2019), but what I want to do now is to
hone  in  on  the  ways  in  which  a  better  understanding  of  the  inescapability  of
stereotypes (and thus prejudice) could be better understood from a Rortian picture of
our moral identity, like the one I presented. An interesting question is what happens if
we use the subtlety of final vocabularies to talk not about the “existential adolescent”
(Rorty  2010b)  who  cannot  help  doubting  her  final  vocabulary,  but  about  the
existentially threatened minority that isn’t allowed to settle in a given description of
herself. Could the description that Rorty provides about the sufferings of the culturally
privileged – and also socially aware – “adolescent ironist” be of help to the culturally
marginalized not by their own imaginative making? Susan Dieleman (2017) argues in
favor of the usefulness of a pragmatic realism in the vein of Rorty (2000b) – where
neither what others say nor The Way The World Is could make much on their own – for
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critical social epistemologies like the one Miranda Fricker presents. I believe that the
subtle ways in which Rorty talks about moral identities can provide examples of just
that kind of toolkit that Dieleman claims activists and social justice theorists can find
useful in Rorty’s work. 
36 Another preliminary reason that is worth exploring in further work is that the link
between  implicit  biases  and  words  is  well  established  in  psychological  research
(Brownstein 2019). While biases can obviously affect how we perceive people we meet
face to face through how they look, what they say, how they say it, and when they say it
can  play  an  equally  important  or  even  greater  role  in  our  prejudiced  responses.
Furthermore, the impact of what we read from others, without seeing them, also has
been studied. For instance, talk of “woman’s literature,” “black literature” (cf. Fought
2006),  or  “gay  literature”  is  not  only  applied  through self-ascribed labels  owing to
empowering narratives, but also pervade culture through prejudicial stereotypes about
themes, writing styles or registers. In sociolinguistics, as we have briefly seen, one can
find an enormous trove of research into the interplays of speech and social status. In a
Rortian framework this is no mystery, words are inherently and emotionally attached
to persons. How we speak is a function of our upbringing and increasingly of who we
want to be like, whom we try to resemble and whom we attempt to distance ourselves
from. In the extreme case of the ironist this is perfectly clear, the ironist only wants to
resemble herself, she can’t stop redescribing what she takes herself to be in order to
purge  every  possible  influence  of  others  from  her  self-image,  from  her  identity.
Ironism could have been described without an appeal to final vocabularies as words,
but Rorty wanted to show how even someone who wants to be as different as possible
from her  peers  can still  retain  a  deep emotional  attachment  to  them.  A politically
relevant attachment. By retaining the public vocabulary of liberalism, Rorty thought,
ironists could be free to distance themselves as much as they could from others without
promoting  cruelty.  This  is  not  the  place  to  see  whether  Rorty  succeeded  in  his
description  of  the  liberal  ironist  and  her  chances  of  attaining  autonomy  without
compromising responsibility and solidarity (cf.  Bernstein 2016; Ramberg 2014; Rorty
2010b;  Schneewind  2010;  Williams  2003).  Nevertheless,  we  can  use  his  choice  of
conceptual tools for this last task in order to repurpose them in other areas where we
can find cruelty and identity together, less sophisticated and common forms of cruelty
notwithstanding (cf. Llanera 2016: 327-30), but also more pressing (Dieleman 2017). 
37 The study of  moral  identities  through the  lenses  of  final  vocabularies  and identity
narratives can also help stress – and make it more palatable at the same time – the
point  Fricker  makes  about  the  viciousness  and  dangers  of  prejudices  while
underscoring  the  inescapability  of  stereotypes.  Stereotypes  are  not  only  inherently
involved in our epistemic and moral perception of others; Rorty provides an additional
argument that makes them profoundly interwoven in our very (social) constitution as
selves. There is no way to be someone without first being some one. We are not only
forced to see others as  types of  persons before knowing them for who they are as
individuals17 – without probably ever being able to see them only as individuals,  we
can’t  help  ourselves  but  to  see  us as  types  of  persons.  Moral  struggles  are  often
described as deliberations about which kind of person we want to be. Taken to social
considerations,  we  often  hear  about  which  society  we  want  future  generations  to
inherit. These are more than catch-phrases. 
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38 If  moral  identities  are  constituted  by  final  vocabularies,  the  point  made  by  many
activists  of  all  sorts  of  disadvantaged  groups  and  oppressed  minorities  that  watch
closely how we speak in order to identify unchecked biases and prejudices – and are
often attacked for doing so – could be strengthened. It could be argued that it is not
only a  matter  of  political  correctness,  of  mere courtesy and manners as  it  is  often
derided as; our choice of words involves the kind of micro-decisions that slowly shape
us as better or worse people. They are also the type of choices individuals make that
not only affect them and their immediate surroundings morally, they can also escalate
into society-wide repercussions. Getting a better grasp of the way our choice of words
shapes us and our social relations can also help shape better ways to intervene in public
debates. We can understand not only why it is so important to be critical and reflexive
in our ways of speaking about ourselves and others, but also why it is so difficult to
effect such changes on those we find at fault – or in ourselves when others find us at
fault,  why so many people are so emotionally and personally involved in how they
speak and why they resist so much attempts by well-meaning activists to change their
forms of expression.18 How could they not be so attached? We are not only asking them
to say the same thing in one way or another, we are indirectly asking them to change
who they are. To change the words in which they can narrate themselves and leaving
some others beyond the pale. While this is exactly what we are asking for and is being
asked of us, it is easy to forget. Just as it is extremely easy to forget how hard change
like the one we are  demanding –  or  being demanded of  us  –  can be to  make,  and
especially all that can go wrong in the process. After all, the perils Rorty is trying to
warn the ironist of are exactly those that await him behind the door of taking from
someone her  most  cherished words  and ways  of  narrating herself  without  offering
anything  in  return.19 What  we  are  demanding  is  a  realignment  of her  loyalties,  a
reassessment of her affections, a profound change in habits. This kind of potential for
cruelty is not only a problem for the ironist,  but the radical reformer interested in
producing effective change too. Or, to put it differently, final vocabularies matter not
just for ironists but also for liberals not sure or particularly interested in their ironism.
In this case, the problem might not be the potential of harming the target of a demand
for vocabulary revision, but his resistance to such change owing to the humiliation and
potential  for  resentment  entailed.  Rorty  helps  us  see  this  in  a  more  nuanced  way
without ever relapsing into essentialist, naively realist/representationalist (Dieleman
2017), or conformist positions considering change as just too difficult or impossible to
happen.
39 Rorty was too quick to discard the conceptual  tools he developed to talk about his
elusive and maybe chimerical liberal ironist. One could argue that he did this to focus
on what really matters politically, getting the intellectuals to start engaging again with
questions of money and not “just” of recognition – or “love” (Rorty 1999a: 223-8). The
rising tide of  exclusionary nationalist  movements pose a striking picture of  Rorty’s
prescience,  particularly  in  the  US.  One  of  the  problems  Rorty  saw  in  claims  for
recognition is talk of cultures as intrinsically worthy of respect (Rorty 1999a: 276). The
“final  vocabulary”  vocabulary  makes  it  very  difficult  to  talk  that  way.  Final
vocabularies are important insofar as they express what people find important, but one
would be missing the point if one were to go and sacralize final vocabularies, what is
sacred, if something is, for Rorty, is the ability to develop and enrich one’s set of words,
the opportunity to make them as much one’s own as one has the ingenuity and desire
to  make  them.  This  goes  back  directly  to  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  that  to
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happen, and among those conditions are affluence and security (Rorty 2000c). One can
campaign for intellectuals to focus more on money and less on love, while still having a
nuanced understanding of what is it to be a person in Rorty’s sense. In sum, Rorty’s
“final vocabulary” vocabulary lets us understand the particular pain that only humans
can suffer of being humiliated, of having one’s identity thrown to the ground, while
never  forgetting  that  there’s  a  lot  of  material work  to  do  to  expand that  privilege
reserved for a few. 
40 In a world in which politics and identity are so deeply intertwined and with all the
promise and dangers this entails, we need all the help we can get to understand both
politics and identity as well as we can. I believe Rorty can still do a great deal for our
understanding of morality and its complex relations with identity. We should not let
his insights in these matters be restrained to the topic of the taming of the ironist. 
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NOTES
1. By  resignifying  others’  vocabularies,  the  ironist  ridicules  them,  criticizing  them  without
offering anything in return to stand in their place – a particularly gratuitous and egregious act
from a pragmatist standpoint. For the ironist cannot provide anything more real to the victim of
her redescription than what’s been taken from her, that is something only a metaphysician can do,
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for she, the metaphysician, does not only criticize someone else’s beliefs, she shows them the
truth, and in doing that she offers an alternative that fills the void of what’s been taken away. 
2. Arguably, this is also what Rorty does with his creation (2010b). He talks of the conflation of
two sorts of people, the “unruffled pragmatist” – like Dewey – and the “existentialist adolescent”
– like Sartre. 
3. See (Voparil 2011) for a discussion on the limits of Rorty’s reading of Brandom as aligned with
his own project of putting “cultural politics” first and the role of the ontological priority of the
social. The Brandomian elements used in this paper to clarify and expand upon Rorty’s concept
of “final vocabulary” do not depend on whether one has a Rortian reading of Brandom or a
Brandomian reading of Brandom. The focus here will be Rorty’s philosophy and not his disciple’s.
4. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Wittgenstein states this point as follows: “One does
not learn to obey a rule by first learning the use of the word ‘agreement.’ Rather, one learns the
meaning of ‘agreement’ by learning to follow a rule. If you want to understand what it means ‘to
follow a rule,’ you have already to be able to follow a rule” (Wittgenstein 1981: 405 [VII-39]).
5. Rorty also considers Price, Brandom, and himself as on the same general project in terms of
anti-representationalism and naturalism (Rorty 2010a), contrary to what Price states (2010). See
(Price  2013)  for  further  elements  in  the  Price-Brandom  debate  regarding  the  extent  of  the
expressivism needed for a neo-pragmatist position. 
6. To say it clearer, when talking about ironists, Rorty describes them as being: “[…] always aware
of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves” (Rorty 1989:
74).
7. The  three  ways  of  relating  ourselves  with  our  final  vocabularies  are  the  aforementioned
ironism, common sense: taking for granted that our final vocabulary to be sufficient to describe
any person’s beliefs, hopes and desires we might encounter; and “metaphyisicism”: defending
common sense’s final vocabulary by linking it to something real and eternal. 
8. One  should  remember  to  take  Davidson  as  the  background  here,  but  Brandom  can  be
considered to do approximately the same job. Reminding things like “the meaning of a word is
the sum of the true sentences it appears in” (Davidson) and “the meaning of a word is the sum of
the endorsed material inferences it takes part of” (Brandom) (paraphrasing and summarizing
both views) can help.
9. Of course, an ironist’s (or even a metaphysician’s) final vocabulary is not commonsensical, and
as such, what may be platitudinous for him may very well not be something nobody would argue
but  more  like  “nobody  like  that  person would  argue.”  Platitudes  are  those  beliefs  that  are
unneeded of argument within a shared final vocabulary or language game.
10. This has normative implications for Rorty. One can find an application of his understanding
of  the  process  of  individualization  as  slowly  and  costly  emerging  out  of  socialization  in  his
reflections on the different roles that primary,  secondary and university education play in a
democratic  ethos  (Rorty  1999a).  Diversity  and  individuality  presuppose  some  degree  of
uniformity. 
11. Since shortly after the publication of CIS, Rorty’s public-private divide has been profoundly
controversial.  Nancy  Fraser  (1990;  1991)  famously  characterized  this  distinction  as  running
against feminist breakthroughs that challenge the separation of the personal and the political.
Rorty has denied these two distinctions should be lumped together (Rorty & Mendieta 2006), but
relativized the usefulness and centrality of his suggestion in CIS on other venues (Rorty 2010b).
For a recent (although amiable) critique of Rorty’s distinction see (Llanera 2016), for a defense of
its general cogency, and usefulness to feminism see (Dieleman 2010).
12. This linguistification and turning away from a psychological theory has the merits of staying
well clear of the siren’s calls coming from the shallow sea plagued with coral reefs that are “deep
theories” of human nature (Ramberg 2014). See also the already mentioned Voparil’s take on the
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difference between Rorty and Brandom on the role of the “ontological priority of the social”
(2011).
13. One can contrast this with his take about how being a woman has yet to be invented through
a  secluded  community,  Rorty  (1998a)  subscribes  to  this  idea  from  Catharine  McKinnon  and
Marilyn Frye. 
14. And, is, of course, a staple of Rorty’s philosophy since its beginnings and central on certain
points of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (cf. Voparil 2014).
15. By “around” I mean not only direct characterizations of ourselves but also things that reflect
on what we say of ourselves indirectly, like characterizing our enemies and friends.
16. Like “inferentialism” in which testimony is considered valid only if it’s deemed credible in
virtue  of  an  inference,  conscious  or  unconscious.  Testimony,  as  such,  is  not  an  autonomous
source of knowledge. 
17. Ramberg (2004: 23) goes further and claims that an ideal Davidsonian interpreter would also
need to assess others through the use of evidentially informed types in the process of radical or
ideal interpretation. The appeal to stereotypes, from an interpretivist perspective, would not just
be a defect or something we must appeal to due to our cognitive limitations, but an in-built and
necessary feature of all awareness. 
18. Without  even  getting  into  the  complexities  of  linguistic  change  from  a  non-ethical
perspective. 
19. Even when Rorty is willing to humiliate the religious fanatic, the racist and the homophobe in
the face of his descendants in class, he is offering something to them in return: an education
(2000d). He is also willing to justify fighting against those that are deeply entrenched in their
exclusionary ways. But he is always warning us of not making everyone our enemy, fights can be
lost when numbers are not on our side and some fights are just too important to lose (cf. Rorty
1999b). 
ABSTRACTS
Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity presents the character of the liberal ironist. An
ironist is a person that has pressing and continuing doubts about her “final vocabulary.” A final
vocabulary is a set of words that one uses to justify and narrate oneself. An interesting question
is why words, and not beliefs, are used by Rorty to characterize someone’s identity. In this paper
I take a step back from liberal ironism and focus on the notion of “final vocabulary” and its role
on a Rortian picture of moral identity. In order to do this, I explore it alongside concepts from
the field of sociolinguistics and from other pragmatist theories of selfhood. I claim that Rorty
presents important insights for a pragmatic naturalist conception of our moral identities. 
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